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Abstract
While a VAT should in principle be neutral with respect to in-
ternational trade, it may in practice function as a tax on exporters'
input purchases if firms receive incomplete VAT refunds. Using data
for over 100 countries that span the majority of historical VAT adop-
tion episodes, this paper finds that  consistent with this hypothesis 
the VAT reduces the exports of an industry with a 10% point higher
intermediate goods share of output by over 8% relative to an industry
with a lower share. This effect is driven by developing countries and
is absent for high-income countries.
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1 Introduction
The worldwide spread of the value-added tax (VAT) is often described as
the most significant global tax development of the past half-century (e.g.
Keen and Lockwood, 2007). One of the selling points of the VAT during this
period has been that it is in principle neutral with respect to international
trade and so would allow countries to raise government revenue without ad-
versely affecting their international competitiveness. This neutrality depends
on two features of a properly functioning VAT: export sales are not subject
to domestic taxation and firms receive credits for VAT paid on their input
purchases. While firms that only sell in their domestic market will generally
use these credits to offset a portion of their VAT liability on their sales, ex-
porters will routinely have credits exceeding their sales liability and hence
will require refunds from the government. Although these refunds are popu-
larly perceived as subsidies for exporters, they in fact merely ensure that the
VAT does not devolve into a tax on exporting firms' input purchases (e.g.
Feldstein and Krugman, 1990).
In actual practice, the refund system has been the achilles' heel (Ebril
et al., 2001) of the VAT in many countries. Firms are often unable to obtain
the refunds that they are owed or are unable to do so in a reasonable and
timely manner. This may be due to the fact that many governments lack the
necessary administrative capacity to properly implement the VAT, especially
given the legitimate concerns about potentially fradulent credit claims. It
may also reflect government officials' reluctance to part with revenue that
has ostensibly already been collected and come under their domain. These
problems with the functioning of the VAT in practice give us strong reason
to suspect that the VAT might indeed tax exporters' input purchases.
In this paper, I empirically evaluate whether this is in fact the case by
drawing on simple consequence of an imperfect VAT: if the VAT functions as a
tax on exporters' input purchases, it should disproportionately affect exports
in industries that tend to rely more intensively on intermediate goods. We
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can therefore examine whether the VAT taxes exports through this channel
by studying the differential effect of VAT adoption on exports across indus-
tries. I examine this question using product-level international trade data
for over 100 countries spanning a period from 1962-2015, which includes the
majority of historical VAT adoption episodes. Guided by a multi-sector the-
oretical model of international trade, I employ an empirical specification that
relates exports at the industry level to an interaction of VAT adoption in a
country and the industry's intermediate goods share of output. This specifi-
cation allows us to control for a wide range of unobservable factors through
the inclusion of country-year, industry-year and country-industry fixed ef-
fects. Since the intensity of intermediate goods use in a country is likely
to be endogenous to the VAT, I calculate measures for each industry from
US data, thus treating these intensities as technological characteristics of the
industries in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that VAT adoption has a substan-
tial negative effect on the exports of industries that rely more heavily on
intermediate goods. Specifically, an industry with a 10% point higher inter-
mediate goods share of output sees a decline in exports of over 8% relative to
an industry with a lower share. To put this magnitude in context, existing
estimates of the relevant trade elasticities from Hummels (2001) and Hertel
et al. (2007) imply that a 8% decrease in the exports of an industry would
result from approximately 1-2% higher prices. These results are robust to
the inclusion of country-industry time trends and I also employ a placebo
test that finds no apparent evidence of an effect of the VAT prior to its actual
adoption.
If these results are in fact driven by imperfections in the VAT refund
system, we should expect to see considerable heterogeneity across countries,
since VAT refund performance is likely to be substantially worse in developing
countries relative to developed countries (e.g. Harrison and Krelove, 2005).
In line with these considerations, I find that the negative effect of the VAT is
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driven by low- and middle-income countries and that there is no significant
effect for high-income countries. Providing further evidence of the role of
VAT refund administration in generating the results in this paper, I also
find that for a subset of countries with available information, the negative
effect of the VAT is significantly more pronounced in countries where a VAT
refund request is more likely to trigger an audit. Taken together, these results
suggest that the VAT does function in part as a tax on exports in countries
that have a weak tax administration system.
Since the VAT was often introduced as a replacement for existing policies
 most commonly turnover taxes, sales taxes, and tariffs  the effect of VAT
adoption identified here would be the joint effect of removing these existing
taxes and introducing the VAT. Since these replaced policies could themselves
tax intermediate goods  in some cases more obviously than the VAT should
 it is perhaps surprising that the VAT has a large negative effect of the type
identified here. This could reflect the fact that countries in practice rely on
the VAT to a much greater extent than they did on the replaced policies, and
so the VAT might simply be more significant in an absolute sense. Broadly
consistent with this explanation, I do not find any evidence of a difference in
the effect of the VAT depending on the types of policies it replaces.
This paper makes a contribution to the existing work in two distinct
literatures. First, it is related to existing studies evaluating the effects of
the VAT on international trade. Desai and Hines (2005) find that the VAT
substantially reduces the volume of trade, with a particularly pronounced
effect for developing countries. Keen and Syed (2006) and Ufier (2014),
however, find no significant effects of the VAT on trade. As highlighted by
Keen and Lockwood (2007), estimating the aggregate effects of the VAT is
challenging because it is very difficult to disentangle the consequences of the
VAT from factors that affect its adoption. By focusing on the differential
effect of the VAT across industries within a country, the approach taken in
the present paper helps deal with these important endogeneity challenges.
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Another related paper that specifically emphasizes the importance of VAT
refunds is Chandra and Long (2013), who use Chinese data to find that
increased VAT rebates lead to an increase in exports. They evaluate the
effects of an increase in VAT refunds, which is something quite distinct from
the present paper, which studies the effect of adopting the VAT as a whole
while emphasizing a mechanism that operates through an imperfect refund
system.
This paper is also connected to a large and growing literature in inter-
national trade that examines the determinants of export composition. In
addition to classical determinants of comparative advantage such as factor
endowments (Romalis, 2004), this literature studies how country character-
istics such as domestic institutions (e.g. Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Chor,
2008; Manova, 2008), natural resources (Debaere, 2014) and demographic
composition (Cai and Stoyanov, 2016) can also shape the composition of a
country's exports.1 The present paper uses a related style of analysis to show
that domestic taxes can also significantly affect export composition. Unlike
the determinants of export composition considered in this existing literature,
the VAT would not properly be a determinant of comparative advantage.
This is because comparative advantage is rigorously defined in terms of Au-
tarky prices (e.g. Deardorff, 1980), whereas an imperfect VAT is effectively
a tax on exports. The finding here therefore complements the existing work
in this area by identifying a factor that can distort export composition away
from patterns of comparative advantage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a
theoretical model that serves as a conceptual framework and helps interpret
the empirical results. Section 3 discusses the empirical specification. Section
4 discusses the data sources and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5
presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.
1See Nunn and Trefler (2014) for a review of a portion of this literature.
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2 Theoretical Framework
This section develops a theoretical framework that helps motivate and inter-
pret the subsequent empirical analysis. In order to capture some of the key
effects of the VAT on exports in a parsimonious manner, I use a multi-sector
version of an Armington (1969) model. The Armington assumption implies
that every country produces a differentiated variety of each good. I assume
that firms produce using a combination of labor and intermediate inputs,
and that the VAT system does not allow for a full rebate of the VAT paid
on inputs.
2.1 Preferences
Consider a setting with many countries and goods. I assume a two-tiered
utility function with an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas utility over goods and a
lower-tier CES utility over the varieties of the good from each country. The
upper-tier utility in country i is given by:
Ui =
∏
Z
ui (z)
αZ +Gi,
where αZ is the income share going to good z, ui (z) is the sub-utility from
consumption of z in country i and Gi is the quantity of a public good. The
sub-utility is given by:
ui (z) =
(∑
i
qij (z)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
, (1)
where qij (z) is the quantity consumed in country i of the variety of z from
country j. With this setup, households spend a fixed fraction of their income
α (z) on each good but can vary the fraction of their income that is devoted
to the specific variety of the good produced in each country.
Labor is the only basic factor of production and labor income is the only
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source of household income. With this, the household demand for a variety
of a good is given by:
qij (z) =
[(1 + τ) pj (z)]
−σ
P (z)1−σ
α (z)wiLi, (2)
where τ is the VAT rate, pj (z) is the price of country j's variety of z and
P (z) is the ideal price index for good z. I assume that government revenue
is used to provide the public good, Gi.
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2.2 Production
Firms produce under constant returns to scale using labor and intermediate
inputs. The production function specifically takes the form:
Yj (z) = Aj (z)Lj (z)
1−β(z)Mj (z)
β(z) ,
where β (z) is the intermediate input share of output; Aj (z) is the produc-
tivity of sector j in country z; Lj (z) is the labor used in j for the production
of z; and Mj (z) is the quantity of a composite intermediate input. I assume
that this composite is a CES aggregator with exactly the same two-tiered
structure as the utility function  as given by (1) and (2)  and has a pre-tax
price index equal to Q.3
Under a VAT, firms pay a tax on intermediate inputs on their exports that
is equal to τ (1− r), where τ is the VAT rate and r ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of
intermediate input expenses that are refunded.4 Under a theoretically ideal
2The analysis would be similar but slightly more complicated if the tax revenue were
rebated lump-sum to the household.
3This specification assumes that the intermediate inputs are freely tradable. The anal-
ysis here would remain almost unchanged if there were an additional non-traded inter-
mediate input produced under constant returns to scale, or if there were iceberg trade
costs.
4On domestic sales, firms would generally be able to use the taxes they have paid on
their inputs to reduce their VAT liability on their output without requiring any refunds.
As a result, difficulties in obtaining refunds do not matter as often or to the same extent.
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VAT, r = 1 so that all taxes on intermediate inputs are fully refunded. The
opposite case, where r = 0, captures a setting where the VAT is so imperfect
so as to essentially be equivalent to a turnover tax for exporters. Given the
static nature of this model, we could also think of delays in providing VAT
refunds as being factors that effectively decrease r. In the same way, to the
extent that VAT refunds can only be obtained by incurring additional costs
(e.g. audit-related expenses, filing costs, bribes, etc.) the effective value of
r will be lower. The after-tax price for the intermediate input bundle given
these assumptions is Q [1 + τ (1− r)].
A point to note in relation to the empirical analysis is that this setup
implies that in the absence of a VAT, intermediate goods would not have
been taxed. This is not necessarily the case, particularly given that the VAT
in reality replaced other taxes that were themselves not neutral with regards
to intermediate goods. Such considerations are omitted from the theoretical
framework here in order to more clearly highlight the central point of the
paper but the potential importance of replaced policies is explored empirically
and discussed in Section 5.5.
Under these assumptions, the price that the firm is able to set for its final
good is determined by the Cobb-Douglas unit cost function:
pj (z) =
1
Aj (z)
[
wj
1− β (z)
]1−β(z) [
Q [1 + τ (1− r)]
β (z)
]β(z)
(3)
This expression relates the price of the good to the wage and the intermediate
input costs.
2.3 Exports
We can now use this setup to derive an expression for exports. Each country
will export its variety of a good to the rest of the world to be used for both
final consumption and as an intermediate input. Given the upper-tier Cobb-
Douglas assumption, (1), and the lower tier CES assumption, (2), households
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will spend a fraction
pj(z)
1−σ
P (z)1−σ α (z) of their income on country j's variety of
product z. Since labor is the only factor of production, the total income of
households outside of country j is
∑
i 6=j wiLi.
5 Hence, foreign households'
expenditure on country j's variety of z is
pj(z)
1−σ
P (z)1−σ α (z)
∑
i 6=j wiLi.
On the production side, firms in industry k in each country will spend a
fraction β (k) on intermediate input purchases. Hence, the total intermedi-
ate input purchases of firms in industry k in a country i is β (k)P (k)Yi (k).
Summing across industries and countries, the total expenditure on all inter-
mediate goods in all foreign countries is
∑
i 6=j
∑
k β (k)P (k)Yi (k). Since we
are assuming the same two-tiered structure for the intermediate input com-
posite as we are for the utility function, a fraction
pj(z)
1−σ
P (z)1−σ α (z) of the total
expenditure on intermediate goods will be on country j's variety of product
z. Hence, the amount that foreign firms spend on country j's variety of z is
pj(z)
1−σ
P (z)1−σ α (z)
∑
i 6=j
∑
k β (k)P (k)Yi (k).
With all this in mind, the total exports (in value terms) of good z from
country j can be written as:
xj (z) =
pj (z)
1−σ
P (z)1−σ
α (z)
[∑
i 6=j
wiLi +
∑
i 6=j
∑
k
β (k)P (k)Yi (k)
]
=
pj (z)
1−σ
P (z)1−σ
α (z)Y−j
where Y−j, the sum of total wages and total intermediate input expenses
in all foreign countries, is the value of total output in the world, excluding
country j.
Next, we take the log of this expression to obtain:
logxj (z) = (1− σ) logpj (z)− (1− σ) logP (z) + logα (z)Y−j
5To save on notation, I assume that there are no foreign taxes. This does not, however,
affect the actual analysis here in any significant manner.
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Plugging in (3), we get:
logxj (z) = (1− σ)
{
[1− β (z)] logwj − [1− β (z)] log [1− β (z)] + β (z) log Q
β (z)
+ β (z) log [1 + τ (1− r)]− logAj (z)
}
− (1− σ) logP (z) + logα (z)Y−j
For simplicity, I assume that the income of the rest of the world is a constant
from the standpoint of the country under analysis, essentially assuming that
this country is small. With this, by grouping all the terms that are constants
from the standpoint of the exporting country into a single term, δ (z), and
re-arranging, we can re-write log exports as:
logxj (z) = (1− σ) β (z) log [1 + τ (1− r)] + (1− σ) [1− β (z)] logwj + δ (z)
This equation relates the exports of good z to an interaction of the country's
tax system and the sector's intermediate input intensity.
This equation  which will guide the empirical specification in Section 3
 has two main terms. The first captures the fact that in industries with
a higher intermediate input intensity, β (z), the VAT will have a greater
effect on exports. This is because as long as r < 1, the VAT directly affects
the cost of using intermediate inputs. This naturally has a greater effect
on an industry that relies more heavily on intermediate inputs. The second
term captures the fact that a change in wages due to the VAT will have a
differential effect across industries depending on their labor intensity, 1 −
β (z). The change in wages is a general equilibrium, economy-wide change
but this expression shows that it could potentially have different effects across
industries. This is a less direct channel than the primary channel of interest
and will turn out to be insignificant empirically.
It will be to useful to use an approximation that allows this equation to
be expressed in a form that is more convenient to interpret and work with.
Specifically, we can use the fact that for a relatively small value for τ (1− r),
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log [1 + τ (1− r)] ≈ τ (1− r). The earlier equation can then be re-written
as:
logxj (z) ≈ (1− σ) β (z) τ (1− r) + (1− σ) [1− β (z)] logwj + δ (z) (4)
We will make extensive use of equation (4) later on.
3 Empirical Specification
The theoretical model from Section 2 explains why the VAT is likely to have
heterogeneous effects on exports across industries that vary in terms of their
intermediate input intensity. The empirical specification will be guided by
equation (4), which relates the log of exports to an interaction between the
VAT and the intermediate input intensity. The primary empirical specifica-
tion will take the following form:
xcit = α1 + α2 (vct × iit) + γct + δit + φci + cit, e (5)
where xcit is the log of exports from country c in industry i in year t; vct is a
measure of the VAT in country c in year t; iit is a measure of the intermedi-
ate input intensity of industry i in year t; γct, δit, and φci are country-year,
industry-year and country-industry fixed effects. The key coefficient of inter-
est is α2, the coefficient on the interaction term vct × iit.
The fixed effects in this specification allow us to control for a variety
of unobserved factors. The country-year fixed effects control for country-
level changes that affect exports across all sectors. The industry-year fixed
effects control for global shocks to the exports of each industry. Finally, the
country-industry fixed effects control for all time-invariant determinants of
export composition. The regression estimates with this specification will be
identified off of variation in the exports of particular industries in particular
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countries following VAT adoption.
As for measures of the VAT, vct, I will make use of both a binary measure
of VAT adoption and a more continuous measure that takes into account the
VAT rate. While my empirical results will be consistent for the two types of
measures, for interpretational reasons, my preferred specification makes use
of the binary rather than the continuous measure. A difficulty with using a
measure such as the VAT rate is that countries with strong administrative
capacities are likely to have high refund rates and are also more easily able
to set a high VAT rate. This means that it can be misleading to treat a high
VAT rate as an indicator of a more intense treatment for the purposes of this
analysis.
As discussed in Section 3, in addition to the direct effect of higher input
taxes, the VAT could also have general equilibrium effects that vary across
industries. The regression specification (5) does not attempt to disentangle
these general equilibrium effects from the direct effect of higher input taxes.
To take these general equilibrium effects into account, we can, again keeping
equation (4) in mind, modify the regression specification to take the following
form:
xcit = α1 + α2 (vct × iit) + ω [wct × (1− iit)] + γct + δit + φci + cit, (6)
where wct is a measure of income per person. The only difference here relative
to equation (5) is that we have a new term that captures the differential
general equilibrium effects.
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4 Data
4.1 Data Sources
We can now turn to the data sources and variables that will be used to
estimate the regression model. I obtain information on the VAT across the
world from Ebril et al. (2001), supplemented by Adhikari (2016). From
these sources, I make use of the date of VAT adoption, the VAT rate at
adoption6 and information about policies that the VAT replaced. For some
specifications, I make use of data on the time it takes to obtain VAT refunds,
submit VAT refund requests and the likelihood of a refund request being
audited, from PwC and the World Bank (2017).
Data on exports are obtained from UNCOMTRADE. The original data
I use is reported in SITC-1 and available from 1962-2015. This is first con-
corded to SITC-2 using Feenstra's (1996) concordance and then from SITC-2
to 1997 NAICS using Feenstra and Lipsey's concordance. In order to provide
a consistent level of aggregation across products, the analysis is conducted
throughout at the 3-digit NAICS level. I compute the exports for each coun-
try by summing up the imports reported by the country's trade partners. To
ensure a consistent sample of reporters, I only use reporting countries who
are available for the entire 1962-2015 period.
Another key variable in equation (5) is the intermediate goods intensity.
I treat the intermediate goods intensity as a technological characteristic of an
industry and measure it using US data, in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and the existing literature on the determinants of export composition.
This ensures that the actual input intensity of a sector in a given country
is not endogenous to the country's policy choices. The relevant measure of
intermediate goods intensity should include any expenses that a firm would
6The literature commonly uses the VAT rate at introduction rather than the VAT rate
in each year due to the difficulty of obtaining a long time-series of VAT rates for such a
large sample of countries.
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incur for which it would be owed a VAT refund. In most countries, this would
include expenses on intermediate inputs and capital goods. Accordingly, the
two measures I consider are intermediate input purchases as a fraction of
output in the industry, and the sum of capital expenses and intermediate
input purchases as a fraction of output. For manufacturing industries, this
information is obtained from the NBER-CES database. The coverage of the
NBER-CES only extends to 2011 and so I use the 2011 data for 2012-2015.
For non-manufacturing industries, intermediate input shares are obtained
using the 1997 US Input-Output Tables from the BEA.
In my baseline specification, I focus exclusively on manufacturing exports.
This is for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, the NBER-CES only
includes manufacturing industries and so I have more complete information
on these industries. Second, the treatment of services, agriculture and natural
resources under the VAT tends to vary widely across countries. Despite this,
as I report in Section 5, I obtain very similar results for non-manufacturing
industries.
Finally, I apply three restrictions to the sample. First, I drop very small
countries, defined as those with a population  obtained from the Penn World
Tables 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015)  of less than 1 million in any sample year.
Second, I only include countries that have at least 5 years of trade data
available before and after VAT adoption. Finally, I drop very small trade
flows, defined as country-industry-year exports of less than $1 million. These
restrictions leave us with 105 countries, 2,915 country-industries and a total
of 100,719 observations at the country-industry-year level.7
7While countries that never adopted the VAT could also be included in the sample,
these countries  with the notable exception of the U.S.  tend to be either very small
or are have exports that are extremely concentrated in natural resources, and so are not
particularly well-suited to serve as a control group.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the list of countries included in the sample together with the
year of VAT adoption. We have a total of 105 countries with adoption years
spanning every decade from the 1960s onward. The earliest adopters in the
sample are Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany and Uruguay, while the latest
are Sierra Leone, Laos, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Zimbabwe. As
noted by Ebril et al. (2001), the VAT was adopted across the world in waves
with relatively early adoptions in Europe and South America and adoptions
in LDCs picking up starting in the 1990s.
Table 2 provides information on the 3-digit NAICS industries and their
relevant characteristics. As discussed earlier, the baseline results in this pa-
per make use only of manufacturing industries (NAICS 300-400). The table
reports the average intermediate input share and capital expenditure shares
of output for each sector across the sample period. We see that there is
a considerable amount of variation in the intermediate input shares across
the industries. For manufacturing industries, the shares mostly range from
about 0.40 for industries such as Printing and Related Support Activities and
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing to about 0.60 for Primary
Metals Manufacturing and Food Manufacturing. Petroleum and Coal Prod-
uct Manufacturing is somewhat of an outlier, with an intermediate input
share above 0.83. The investment share of output also varies substantially
between the industries and has a weak negative correlation (≈ −0.22) with
the intermediate input shares.
Of the non-manufacturing industries, three are agricultural, two are re-
lated to natural resource extraction and two are service industries. There is
no clear pattern in terms of how these intermediate input intensities compare
to those for manufacturing industries. For example, Animal Production and
Aquaculture has the highest intermediate input share among all the indus-
tries, while Fishing, Hunting and Trapping has one of the lowest.
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5 Results
5.1 Baseline estimates
The baseline estimates for equation (5) are presented in Table 3. In the first
column, the coefficient of interest is the interaction between a binary variable
that records VAT adoption and the value of intermediate inputs as a share of
output at the sector-year level. The coefficient value is negative and precisely
estimated. The magnitude of the estimate suggests that an industry with a
10% point higher intermediate input share sees a relative decrease in exports
of over 12% following VAT adoption.
To get a sense of the magnitude of this coefficient, it is useful to consider
some reasonable values for the relevant trade elasticity. From equation (5), we
see that the elasticity that matters here is the Armington elasticity within an
industry. Hummels (2001) and Hertel et al. (2007) estimate these elasticities
at a level of aggregation that is comparable to the one used here, and find
that depending on the specification, the average of the estimated elasticities
tends to range from 5 to 7. This would mean that a 12% decrease in exports
would correspond to an approximately 1.5-2% increase in prices.
Columns 2-4 in Table 3 make use of different measures of input intensity.
Column 2 uses the value of intermediate inputs plus capital investments as
a share of output. It makes sense to consider such a specification because
capital investments are generally treated in a manner similar to intermediate
inputs under the VAT in most countries. The estimated coefficient is very
similar to Column 1. The third and fourth columns show that these effects
seem to be driven by intermediate inputs rather than capital expenses. This
is possibly the case because capital investments account for a small share of
output as compared to intermediate inputs (see Table 2).
Table 4 shows the results from empirical specifications that are closer
to equations (4) and (6), allowing us to make greater use of the theoretical
framework in interpreting the estimates. Column 1 uses the standard VAT
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rate at introduction as a measure of the VAT rather than a binary indicator,
and yields a point estimate of about -5. Assuming a trade elasticity of 7,
(4) would imply that 1 − r ≈ 0.70 and so r ≈ 0.30. Taking the model
literally, this is a refund rate that is of a reasonable order of magnitude,
though perhaps small as an average for the entire cross-section of countries.
One should note, however, that there are factors missing in the model which
would imply a larger refund rate given the same coefficient estimates. For
example, the model does not include compliance costs associated with VAT
refunds, costs from refund delays or the potential adverse productivity effects
of facing higher intermediate input costs. If such factors were incorporated
into the model, the inferred refund rate would likely be higher.
Turning to the other columns in Table 4, column 2 shows that when both
the binary and the continuous measures are included, only the binary variable
is statistically significant. As discussed earlier, the continuous measure is
unlikely to truly measure the intensity of the treatment across countries
because countries with a high VAT rate are often those with strong tax
administration and so are likely to have a relatively high refund rate. The
true intensity of the treatment depends on both having a relatively low refund
rate and a high tax rate  something that would be quite difficult to measure.
Columns 3 and 4 bring us even closer to equation (4) by allowing the
general equilibrium effects of the VAT to have a heterogeneous effect across
industries as in the regression specification (6). To do this, I include an
interaction of GDP per capita with one minus the intermediate input share of
the industry, consistent with equation (4). The coefficient on the differential
general equilibrium effect term is insignificant in both columns, suggesting
that this indirect channel does not seem to play a major role in practice.
5.2 Heterogeneity across income levels
Table 5 considers heterogeneity in these effects across countries of different
income levels. Column 1 includes the interaction of the main treatment vari-
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able with a binary variable that records whether the country is a high income
country or not.8 The coefficient on the new interaction term is statistically
significant and implies that the net effect on high income countries is close
to zero, suggesting that the baseline results are driven primarily by low- and
middle-income countries. Consistent with this, a test that the sum of the
two coefficients is equal to zero yields a t-statistic of about -0.51 (P-value
≈ 0.614), meaning that there is no statistically significant effect for high-
income countries.
Columns 2 and 3 explore further heterogeneity based on income level by
including an interaction of the treatment with a low-income country indica-
tor.9 Column 2 suggests that the impact is indeed greater for low-income
countries. Column 3 includes interactions of the main treatment with both
high- and low-income indicators and finds that the effect on low income coun-
tries is greater than for middle-income countries  the omitted group  but
that this difference is not statistically significant.
Taken together, these results imply that the VAT discourages intermedi-
ate input intensive exports specifically in middle and low-income countries.
A natural interpretation for this finding is that the VAT refund system works
in a more ideal manner in high-income countries, a point that would be con-
sistent with anecdotal and survey evidence (e.g. Harrison and Krelove, 2005).
5.3 Evidence on VAT refund administration
While these results are suggestive of the importance of the quality of VAT
refund administration, it would useful to see whether we can link these results
directly to information about VAT refunds across the world. We can obtain
some relevant information from PwC and the World Bank (2017), which is
a study that considers various aspects of the tax system faced by the same
8The countries that are classified as high-income are those in Western Europe, as well
as Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. These are the countries that have been
relatively high-income throughout the sample period.
9Low-income status is based on the World Bank's classification system.
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hypothetical firm across the world and specifically provides some data on
VAT refunds. The main limitation of this study as applied to the current
paper is that the hypothetical case study firm is one that does not export,
and the study only provides information on VAT refunds when a refund is
available to the case-study firm. Since, as documented in the study, VAT
refunds are in practice restricted to exporters in many countries, we have
relevant refund information on much fewer countries than those that are
technically covered by the study.
Owing to these limitations, we can only consider a subsample of 56 coun-
tries for which we have the necessary information. Column 1 of Table 6
repeats the baseline regression on this subsample, and shows that the esti-
mated coefficient is comparable to the one obtained in the full sample. The
three available indicators relating to VAT refunds are the likelihood of a VAT
refund request triggering an audit, the number of weeks it generally takes for
excess VAT credits to be refunded, and the number of compliance hours it
takes to file a VAT refund. The remaining columns of Table 6 report the re-
sults of regressions that include an interaction of the main treatment variable
with these characteristics of the refund system.
Column 2 uses an indicator variable that records whether an audit is
either likely or very likely, as opposed to being unlikely or very unlikely. The
coefficient estimates show that the negative effect of the VAT on intermediate
input intensive industries is driven by countries where audits are more likely.
The implied point estimate for countries where audits are unlikely is almost
equal to zero. This is again consistent with VAT refund considerations being
central to the results identified in this paper.
Columns 3 and 4 consider interactions of the main treatment with vari-
ables that record whether it takes more than 6 months for the firm to receive
a refund and whether the refund request takes more than 24 hours of com-
pliance time, respectively. There is some evidence that longer refund times
are associated with a more negative effect on intermediate input intensive ex-
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ports, though there is no evidence of a significant effect of compliance time.
When we include all three additional interaction terms in Column 5, we can
see that only the interaction with audit likelihood is statistically significant.
Taken together, these results are suggestive of an important role for the
VAT refund audits. Frequency of audits presumably indicate a government
that is reluctant to provide refunds and perhaps is weary of false claims.
These results imply that such a reluctance can have a serious distortionary
effect on exports, and so there is potentially a substantial benefit from im-
proving this aspect of VAT administration.
5.4 Non-manufacturing industries
These baseline results look specifically at the exports of manufacturing in-
dustries. It is natural to ask whether the results are substantially different
for non-manufacturing industries such as agriculture, natural resources and
services. The first column of Table 7 includes agriculture and natural re-
source sectors. We see that the main coefficient of interest is essentially the
same with these inclusions. The second column includes the two services in-
dustries that we have data for. In this case, the coefficient drops to a certain
extent but is still of a similar general magnitude. When all industries are
included, as in column 3, the main coefficient of interest is about 0.80. This
provides us with a somewhat more conservative magnitude than the baseline
manufacturing results. This magnitude implies that an industry with a 10%
point higher intermediate input share sees a decline in exports of about 8%
following VAT adoption. Based on the trade elasticities discussed earlier,
this would correspond to an increase in prices of about 1-1.5%.
5.5 Replaced policies
The VAT was often introduced as a replacement for existing taxes. The most
common taxes replaced by the VAT are different forms of turnover taxes,
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sales taxes, and tariffs (Ebril et al., 2001).10 When the VAT replaces such
existing policies, our estimates would capture the joint effect of removing
these policies and adopting the VAT. Given that policies such as turnover
taxes more obviously tax intermediate goods than the VAT does, it is perhaps
surprising that we do find a large negative effect of VAT adoption. This could
reflect in part the fact that countries in practice rely on the VAT to a much
greater extent than they relied on the policies it replaced and so the VAT
might simply matter more in an absolute sense.
Table 8 draws on information about the policies that the VAT replaced
from Ebril et al. (2001) to examine whether the impact of VAT adoption
varies depending on which policies it replaced. Since this information is
missing for many countries in our sample, the first column repeats the base-
line regression for the 77 countries for which we have information on replaced
policies. We see that the estimated coefficient for this sample of countries
is comparable to the baseline. The second column of Table 7 introduces an
interaction of the main treatment variable with a binary variable that records
whether the policies replacing the VAT include trade taxes. The second and
third columns repeat this exercise but with turnover and sales taxes, respec-
tively, rather than trade taxes. The final column includes all of the additional
interaction terms.
Across these specifications, we do not find any significant heterogeneity
in the effect depending on the policies that were replaced by the VAT. This
is perhaps especially surprising in the case of turnover taxes, which apply
in principle to every stage of production without a crediting system as with
the VAT. One explanation, as mentioned above, could be that countries rely
more on the VAT than they did on the turnover taxes it replaced. Another
relevant factor here is the fact that  as noted in Ebril et al. (2001)  even
prior to the VAT, countries made use of various methods to avoid cascading,
10Based on Ebril et al. (2001), the VAT does not seem to have commonly replace direct
taxes.
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such as imposing reduced rates on input goods. Particularly combined with
the less significant nature of these taxes in an absolute sense as compared to
the VAT, this might help explain why we find no evidence of heterogeneity
in the effect based on differences in replaced policies.
5.6 Trends and Placebo Tests
The empirical specification employed in this analysis looks at the differential
effect of VAT introduction across industries. By doing so, it helps reduce
both simultaneous causality and policy endogeneity concerns relative to an
analysis of country-level outcomes. For example, the country-year fixed ef-
fects would help control for any tendency for countries to adopt the VAT in
a period of greater growth of overall trade. The empirical strategy would be
invalid if countries were more likely to introduce the VAT when industries
that rely more on intermediate inputs were performing poorly. While there
is to my knowledge no obvious reason to think that this might be the case, it
is still worthwhile to consider some robustness tests that could help address
such concerns.
Table 9 shows two distinct ways of doing this. While we cannot include
country-industry-year fixed effects, we can include time trends at the country-
industry level. The first two columns of Table 8 include 5- and 10- year linear
growth trends of exports at the country-industry level. We can see that the
main coefficient of interest is largely unchanged with the inclusion of these
trends.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 consider a type of placebo test. Specifically,
we pretend that the VAT was introduced either 10 or 20 years before the
actual introduction date and see whether this placebo introduction has an
effect by the year of true VAT introduction. This specifically means that we
are using a placebo treatment variable in place of the VAT variable and we
drop the data for a country for all the years following VAT adoption. The
results show that the placebo estimates are insignificant, suggesting that my
22
main results are are in fact capturing the effect of VAT adoption rather than
other coincidental trends.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of a substantial effect of the VAT on interna-
tional trade. Specifically, I find that VAT adoption leads to a large negative
effect on the exports of industries that tend to rely more heavily on interme-
diate goods. This effect is driven by low- and middle-income countries and
is absent for high-income countries. These results are consistent with the
VAT functioning as a tax on the input purchases of exporters in countries
where, due to poor tax administration, governments fail to fully provide re-
funds to businesses with excess VAT credits. In evaluating the effect of the
VAT historically, these results imply that the adoption of the VAT had nega-
tive efficiency effects well beyond those generally expected of a consumption
tax. Especially given the importance attached to export competitiveness in
many developing countries, these findings suggest that there could be a sub-
stantial benefit from moving towards a more effective system of VAT refund
administration.
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Table 1: VAT adoption year by country
Country Year Country Year
Albania 1996 Kenya 1990
Algeria 1992 Laos 2009
Argentina 1975 Lebanon 2002
Australia 2000 Madagascar 1994
Austria 1973 Malawi 1989
Bangladesh 1991 Mali 1991
Belgium 1971 Mauritania 1995
Benin 1991 Mauritius 1998
Bolivia 1973 Mexico 1980
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 Mongolia 1998
Brazil 1967 Morocco 1986
Bulgaria 1994 Mozambique 1999
Burkina Faso 1993 Nepal 1998
Burundi 2009 Netherlands 1969
Cambodia 1999 New Zealand 1986
Cameroon 1999 Nicaragua 1975
Canada 1991 Niger 1986
Central African Republic 2001 Nigeria 1994
Chad 2000 Norway 1970
Chile 1975 Pakistan 1990
China 1994 Panama 1977
Colombia 1975 Paraguay 1993
Congo 1997 Peru 1973
Costa Rica 1975 Philippines 1988
Croatia 1998 Poland 1993
Côte d'Ivoire 1992 Portugal 1986
Denmark 1967 Republic of Korea 1977
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Dominican Republic 1983 Romania 1993
Ecuador 1970 Rwanda 2001
Egypt 1991 Senegal 1980
El Salvador 1992 Sierra Leone 2010
Ethiopia 2003 Singapore 1994
Finland 1994 Slovenia 1999
France 1968 South Africa 1991
Gabon 1995 Spain 1986
Gambia 2003 Sri Lanka 1998
Germany 1968 Sudan 2000
Ghana 1998 Sweden 1969
Greece 1987 Switzerland 1995
Guatemala 1983 Thailand 1992
Guinea 1996 Macedonia 2000
Guinea-Bissau 2001 Togo 1995
Haiti 1982 Trinidad and Tobago 1990
Honduras 1976 Tunisia 1988
Hungary 1988 Turkey 1985
Indonesia 1985 Uganda 1996
Ireland 1972 United Kingdom 1973
Israel 1976 Tanzania 1998
Italy 1973 Uruguay 1968
Jamaica 1991 Venezuela 1999
Japan 1989 Viet Nam 1999
Jordan 2001 Zambia 1995
Zimbabwe 2004
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Table 2: Intermediate input and investment shares by
industry
NAICS Description Input Share Investment Share
541 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 0.31
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 0.40 0.04
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.41 0.03
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 0.42 0.04
114 Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 0.45
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 0.45 0.05
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0.46 0.03
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.47 0.02
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 0.47 0.03
562 Management of Companies and Enterprises 0.47
333 Machinery Manufacturing 0.48 0.03
325 Chemical Manufacturing 0.48 0.05
335 Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 0.50 0.03
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.50 0.04
315 Apparel Manufacturing 0.50 0.01
111 Crop Production 0.51
212 Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.51
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.52 0.01
322 Paper Manufacturing 0.55 0.05
313 Textile Mills 0.59 0.03
336 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.60 0.03
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 0.60
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 0.60 0.03
314 Textile Product Mills 0.61 0.02
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 0.63 0.04
311 Food Manufacturing 0.65 0.02
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324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.83 0.03
112 Animal Production and Aquaculture 0.85
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Table 3: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: log of exports
VAT × input share -1.264*** -1.343***
(0.285) (0.305)
VAT × input plus investment share -1.331***
(0.300)
VAT × investment share -1.225 -3.050
(2.219) (2.353)
Observations 100,719 100,719 100,719 100,719
R-squared 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (105 clusters).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Regression based on equation (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: log of exports
VAT × input share -2.044*** -1.225***
(0.646) (0.284)
VAT rate × input share -5.219*** 5.014 -5.126***
(1.846) (4.047) (1.816)
log GDP per capita × (1 - input share) 0.202 0.228
(0.305) (0.309)
Observations 100,719 100,719 97,581 97,581
R-squared 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (105 clusters). Country-year, sector-year
and country-sector fixed effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
29
Table 5: Heterogeneity by income level
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: log of exports
VAT × input share -1.582*** -1.120*** -1.452***
(0.326) (0.301) (0.353)
VAT × input share × high income 1.354** 1.241**
(0.516) (0.533)
VAT × input share × low income -1.048* -0.754
(0.600) (0.622)
Observations 100,719 100,719 100,719
R-squared 0.933 0.933 0.933
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (105 clusters).
Country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: VAT refund administration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log of exports
VAT × input share -1.144*** 0.177 -0.723* -0.974** 0.172
(0.318) (0.553) (0.393) (0.370) (0.553)
VAT × input share×audit likely -1.884*** -1.579**
(0.641) (0.653)
VAT × input share×long refund delay -1.414* -0.831
(0.776) (0.887)
VAT × input share×lengthy compliance -0.806 0.187
(0.860) (0.984)
Observations 54,822 54,822 54,822 54,822 54,822
R-squared 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (56 clusters). Country-year, sector-year and
country-sector fixed effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Including agriculture and/or services
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: log of exports
Including agriculture Including services All industries
VAT × input share -1.099*** -0.851*** -0.829***
(0.257) (0.250) (0.230)
Observations 119,565 110,969 129,817
R-squared 0.922 0.929 0.920
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (105 clusters).
Country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects
are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Heterogeneity based on replaced policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: log of exports
VAT × input share -1.174*** -1.218*** -1.125*** -1.023** -0.799
(0.303) (0.309) (0.392) (0.396) (0.664)
VAT × input share ×replaced tariffs 0.820 0.698
(0.822) (0.815)
VAT × input share ×replaced turnover -0.112 -0.387
(0.526) (0.679)
VAT × input share ×replaced sales taxes -0.293 -0.480
(0.523) (0.673)
Observations 77,370 77,370 77,370 77,370 77,370
R-squared 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (77 clusters). Country-year, sector-year, and
country-sector fixed effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Linear trends and placebo test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: log of exports
All years Only data up to VAT year
VAT × input share -1.136*** -1.106***
(0.307) (0.298)
Lagged five-year change in log of exports 0.232***
(0.00863)
Lagged ten-year change in log of exports 0.253***
(0.00824)
10-year placebo VAT × input share 0.167
(0.397)
20-year placebo VAT × input share -0.239
(0.363)
Observations 83,178 74,018 43,688 43,688
R-squared 0.944 0.952 0.910 0.910
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (105 clusters). Country-year,
sector-year and country-sector fixed effects are included.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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